LU konferenceAnna Auzāne
The Notion of the Literature of Limited Truth in the Prose and Journalism of Miervaldis Birze
Keywords: Miervaldis Birze, “the literature of limited truth”, the Soviet occupation, journalism, humour, censorship, self-censorship.
The Latvian writer and physician Miervaldis Birze (1921–2000) introduced the notion of “the literature of limited truth” in his prose and journalism. It was a literature shaped by the politics of the USSR, that was subject to censorship and contributed to the writer’s self-censorship. The literature of limited truth openly acknowledges its omission and concealment of facts. M. Birze established this meaning, which, in parallel with the language of Aesop, can be used to describe the literary environment of the Latvian SSR. The literature of limited truth is the consequence of a long-cultivated ideology. It was not unavoidable, yet necessary, if one wanted to be among the members of the Latvian Soviet Writers’ Union, travel abroad, be honoured, receive awards and provisions of material goods or services.
M. Birze can be called an engaged writer, however with several reservations. He has written many medical stories, the most striking of which is “The Sandglass” (1964). It narrates diseases, addictions, death, attachment, love, and looks into people’s lives from a psychological rather than a political angle. His feuilletons, essays, and travelogues often turn out to be still binding in the first quarter of the 21st century. Furthermore, M. Birze was not involved in ideological activities to the same extent as, for example, the odious Arvīds Grigulis (1906–1989), even if sometimes one can get the impression that the humourist’s naivety was simulated or calculated. Instead, following the restoration of independence, M. Birze used the idea of “the literature of limited truth” to show the youth “how it was back then.”
Raivis Bičevskis
“Irony is a clear consciousness of an eternal agility, of the infinitely abundant chaos”: Understanding of Romantic Irony in the Texts of Friedrich Schlegel
Keywords: Friedrich Schlegel, Romanticism, irony, philosophy, reality.
Romanticism ‒ both in its national versions and as a European movement ‒ is in a paradoxical relationship with tradition. The Enlightenment ‒ at least, in the case of some important areas of the cultural parade ‒ broke the ties with the pre-modern world; Romanticism, on the other hand, rediscovered the ancient and pre-modern world, but only thanks to the Enlightenment. The Romanticists returned to ancient elements, however, no longer following them as models, but creatively and meta-reflexively giving them a different meaning and granting the meaning anew. One of these experiments of Romantic thought and scope of the world is the concept of irony. It can be claimed that the irony, which Romanticism and especially Friedrich Schlegel advocates in the texts, embodies the very essence of the Romantic experiment. Romantic irony reveals Romanticism simultaneously as an articulation and critique of modernity. Irony is a way to “preserve the secret of the world” (Novalis) under the preoccupation of modern socio-political ideologies and philosophies of history with the goals and tasks of humanity.
Jana Dreimane
The Library of the Society for the History and Antiquities in Riga and Its Path Following the Society’s Liquidation
Keywords: history of Latvian libraries in the 19th and 20th centuries, libraries of German-Baltic societies, transfer of cultural values, Parity Commission, Nazi occupation, Soviet occupation.
The 19th century in Europe marked the rise and flourishing of learned societies across various disciplines. In Latvia, which at the time was part of the Russian Empire, several German-Baltic scholarly societies were established, playing a crucial role in the advancement of regional historical studies and significantly contributing to the discovery, preservation, and dissemination of historical sources. Among these, the Society for the History and Antiquities of the Baltic Provinces of Russia (Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde der Ostseeprovinzen Russlands), later renamed the Society for the History and Antiquities in Riga (Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde zu Riga) in 1919, is particularly noteworthy. One of the primary objectives of this Society, founded in 1834, was to compile a comprehensive collection of printed works and manuscripts pertaining to the history, antiquities, literature, and peoples of the Baltic provinces. Since the Society’s budget was limited, the development of the library was predominantly supported by member donations and book exchanges. Nevertheless, over the course of a century, the library evolved into one of the most extensive and systematically curated repositories of Baltic literature in Latvia. During the 1930s and 1940s, the library’s collection was dispersed among various heritage institutions with some portions being relocated abroad. This study aims to identify, consolidate, and analyse information about the Society’s library, including its distribution and transfer, in order to assess the value of its collection, identify the principal custodians in Latvia and abroad, and clarify unresolved issues in the library’s history.
Inga Gaugere
The Potentiality of Beginning: Hannah Arendt on Natality
Keywords: Arendt, natality, action, world, principium, initium.
This essay delves into concept of natality in Hannah Arendt’s philosophy, examining its multifaced dimensions. Natality is one of six human conditions which Arendt formulated in her opus magnum, “The Human Condition” (1958). Natality, as elucidated by Arendt, encompasses existential, transcendental, political and theoretical dimensions. The essay begins by highlighting natality’s existential significance and explores its transcendental features, particularly its attributes ‒ principium and initium ‒ revealing its role in instigating novelty and renewal within human affairs. Moreover, the essay examines Arendt’s notion of a “second birth” in the political realm, where natality illuminates itself in human freedom and ability to act and change the world of human affairs. Finally, the phenomena of natality are explained in the realm of thought through human will and birth in nunc stanc, the endless and timeless world of thought.
Linda Gediņa
The Method of Hermeneutic Phenomenology for Interpretation of Literature. Nature and Presentation of Artwork
Keywords: hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger, temporality of presence, topography of anticipation for interpretation in author’s artwork, essence of artwork, philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer.
The phenomenology of literature is concerned with the perception of how time and space are shaped and modelled in a literary work.
Literary interpretation, on the other hand, analyses the methods, means and tools whereby a text or work becomes a literary work of art and the insights that can be drawn from it.
A hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of a text is both an outline ‒ that is, a topography of the temporal space of a given work and the tools used to achieve it ‒ as well as situating of a given work and the employed tools in the context of a literary, cultural and interpretive tradition.
In this essay, I will focus primarily on Heidegger’s insights and strategies for interpreting various poems, and I will consider them in the context of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
The known/unknown boundary in this case is a brief outline of a method by which to discover hidden, perhaps not immediately discernible meanings and significations in a text.
Ineta Kivle
Philosophical Essay: How Is It That Knowing Is Not-Knowing?
Keywords: Socrates, Nicholas of Cusa, meaningful world, Herman Hesse, ultimative Situations, Karl Jaspers, Edmund Husserl, knowing and knowledge.
The border between the known and the unknown is always different ‒ rational, existential, and mathematical ‒ but in all cases it reveals human aims, choices and abilities, where the dynamics of the known and the unknown begin. This philosophical essay views four fragments from different philosophical approaches: Socratic questioning, intended to approach true knowledge and knowing, the examples of existential and ultimate situations exploring cognitions of Karl Jaspers and Herman Hesse, the known world as a meaningful horizon in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, mathematical methods for understanding of being and infinity by Nicholas of Cusa.
These different fragments of thoughts show that the known-unknown boundary is a universal order of life, which means something different to each thinker and manifests itself differently for each of us. It is impossible to have one limit of knowledge applicable to all people and all situations ‒ every person and each philosophy has its own. Nevertheless, everyone could find oneself on the edge of the known and the unknown and experience the “magic” and joy of discovering new knowledge.
Māris Kūlis
Public Truths: Reason and Madness, Collective Knowledge and Social Cohesion
Keywords: common sense, politics, social cohesion, society, truth, lies.
This paper delves into the intricate dynamics of societal truths, straddling the complex interface between rationality and irrationality, collective knowledge, and the cohesion within society. The paper explores the multifaceted nature of public truths, emphasizing their evolution and manifestation within the social framework that underpins collective thought and action. The discussion pivots around the concept of common sense, not merely as a pragmatic heuristic but as a fundamental societal force that shapes and is shaped by collective beliefs and the broader political and social milieu. It is argued that societal truths are not static artifacts of knowledge but are dynamically negotiated through the continuous interplay of societal forces that govern public discourse. These truths are portrayed as both products and processes ‒ constructed through collective engagement and serving as the bedrock for further social interaction and political decision-making. The analysis extends to the political arena, where the propagation and manipulation of truths can both unify and divide communities, reflecting the dual nature of truth as both a cohesive agent and a potential source of discord. The paper presents an examination of how media, education, and political institutions shape societal truths, highlighting the importance of understanding these dynamics to encourage more intentional management of public knowledge and cohesion. By integrating theoretical insights with practical observations, the paper contributes to the broader discourse on knowledge, power, and social structure, offering perspectives on how truths are woven into the fabric of everyday life. The author calls for a re-evaluation of the assumptions underlying common sense and societal truths.
Rihards Kūlis
On the Border of Known and Unknown: Immanuel Kant and Karl Rahner
Keywords: cognition, the unknown, the unknowable, limits of cognition, transcendence.
The beginnings of Western philosophy are largely marked by Parmenides’ (6th century BC) question, full of wonder and awe: “why there is something instead of nothing?” Parmenides does not know the answer to this question. Modern philosophy does not provide an acceptable answer either. However, the question itself is still alive, prompting one to consider the boundaries of existence and non-existence, known and unknown, knowable and unknowable (also thinkable and unthinkable).
Human existence on the border of the known and the unknown can be viewed from various angles and in different coherencies: one can rightly talk about the relationship between the known and the unknown in the cognitive process, in the daily practice of learning the world and in social developments; after all, all human existence transpires on this border, from a child’s efforts to learn about the world to a nuclear physicist’s questions about the nature of elementary particles or a theologian’s questions about God. I would like to claim that the statement “existence on the border of the known and the unknown” could justifiably be treated as a fundamental existential category.
In the history of Western philosophy and culture, the problem of the border between the known and the unknown has, over time, found expression in the form of specific cultural (philosophical) archetypes: B. Pascal’s “the abyss” (le gouffre), M. Heidegger’s “Existenz on hillside” (Existenz am Abhang), K. Jaspers’s “the Encompassing” (das Umgreifende), etc.
The article is dedicated to the problem of the known and the unknown, mainly based on the views of I. Kant and K. Rahner.
According to I. Kant, the world can be cognized endlessly, but one condition must be kept in mind: the result of this process does not bear the quality of absolute and complete knowledge. This would only be possible for divine intelligence, not human understanding. Kant limits knowledge or, more precisely, man’s illusion of the limitlessness of his cognitive abilities. Unlike the speculative metaphysician, he does not yearn to penetrate the mysteries of the transcendental. The philosopher wants to find a respectful place for faith, at the same time elevating science and allocating it (in the aspect of natural-science research) inviolable limits. At the point where science must stop, if it wants to remain science, we can allot the place to faith, which, according to the philosopher, is an integral element of human existence.
According to K. Rahner, a man inhabits the anteroom of a mystery whose name is God. God cannot be cognized in the same way as an object is cognized. However, Rahner thinks, the mystery can be approached by following a special cognitive path. This is the path of the mystic. Admittedly, Rahner separates this path from, in his opinion, subjective and empty fantasies. The philosopher, following the tradition of Western culture, is convinced that the practice of the mystic must also be subject to rational control.
Despite the fundamental differences, when thinking about the border between the knowable and the unknowable, the views of both philosophers hold similar elements. Whilst allowing for the presence of mysticism in the cognition and learning of the world, it is limited by preserving the fundamental orientations of the Western rationalist tradition.
Gita Leitlande
The Stoic Teaching on Emotions: Can It Be Interpreted in a Way That Is Conceptually Acceptable Today?
Keywords: Stoicism, contemporary Stoicism, emotions, the ideal Stoic, the classification of emotions.
The Stoic teaching on emotions is seemingly one of the best-known aspects of Stoicism to the general public. At the same time, it is one of Stoicism’s most significant obstacles to being seen as a relevant and applicable philosophy for life in the 21st century. This is because the popular view of the Stoic teaching on emotions holds that a Stoic is an emotionless and indifferent person who successfully represses her emotions. Moreover, whatever happens, a Stoic is as unfeeling as a statue. This view of emotions in Stoicism is, of course, unattractive and inconsistent with modern psychology. However, both the heritage of the ancient Stoics and the later scholars of Stoicism can substantiate that these beliefs, although derived from Stoicism, are only a superficial and one might even say ‒ caricatured ‒ reading of the teaching. The question raised in this article is whether Stoic teaching on emotions can be interpreted in a way that is acceptable today. This question involves a linkage with the applicability of Stoicism today: is Stoicism as a philosophy for life still relevant and usable, or has it inevitably lost its relevance and viability, at least in this respect? In order to arrive at the answers to these questions, the author analyses the most critical tenets of Stoic philosophy’s teaching on emotions: how emotions are formed, the classification of emotions, and the role of emotions in the life of a Stoic, as well as the Stoic ideal regarding emotions. The author concludes that Stoic teaching on emotions, when delved into, is valid and defensible even today, which is confirmed by the current research in psychology (as far as psychology is concerned). This also permits to retain the broader relevance of Stoic philosophy, which is not discredited by a fundamentally mistaken understanding of human emotions.
Kitija Mirončuka
On the Way from Understanding to Action. Levinas and Fanon on Self-Other Relations
Keywords: ethics of responsibility, inclusion, racism, cohesion, structural violence.
For Emmanuel Levinas, human relations are based on the tendency of the imperialist subjectivity of the Self to destroy the alien and Other, subordinating it to its own identity. Self and Other become the inevitably interconnected elements of an asymmetrical relationship in which the Self becomes the bearer of values, and the Other ‒ the external and alien to be encountered and appropriated. However, the relationship between the Self and Other is not as homogeneous. As soon as the Self attempts to take over the Other as the basic element of its own being, the Other tries to accomplish something similar with the Self. There is no longer a moral obligation, a peace, between the Self and the Other, but a never-ending conflict. Hence, the inclusion of Frantz Fanon’s analysis of racial conflict in this discussion illuminates the dynamics of the Self-Other relationship in the real world, not only in relation to Totality. Fanon’s postcolonial study of racism reveals how historical and societal structures reinforce the inequalities of the Self-Other relationship, which seeks power and subjugation, highlighting the urgent need to dismantle systems of oppression and promote genuine equality and understanding. This nuanced perspective highlights the complexity of power dynamics and the role of ethical responsibility in fostering inclusive relationships. The aim of this article is to reveal the true dynamics of the Self-Other relationship by deepening the idea of an ethics of responsibility proposed by Levinas with the observations and conclusions of Fanon’s analysis of racism in human relations, which were also based on a significant imperialist subjectivity, analysed through the prism of colonialism.
Velga Vēvere
On Both Sides of Experience: William James on Pure Experience and Mystical States of Experience
Keywords: William James, phenomenon of mystical, mystical consciousness, pure experience.
Although the nineteenth-century American psychologist and philosopher William James (1842–1910) is not traditionally considered a phenomenologist, the features of a phenomenological perspective can be found in his works. So, for example, he talks about the flow of consciousness, intentionality, retentions and protentions, fringes of consciousness, etc. His focus is precisely on the phenomenon of experience, hence, it is possible to talk about James’s phenomenology of experience, where the central concept is pure experience, which has a pre-rational nature. This raises the question of the mode of describing this experience: how to put into words what lies beyond the threshold of consciousness? To this end, James uses descriptions of mystical states of consciousness in his work “The Varieties of Religious Experience”. James had a unique conception of what should or should not be designated as “mystical”. Unlike the contemporary tendency to limit the term “mystical” to a rather narrow band of unitive states of consciousness, James saw “mystical experiences”’ as encompassing a broad and fluid spectrum of mental states, ranging from deep poetic insight, déjà vu, ghostly visitations, and psychedelic experiences to the more overtly religious ecstasies and unitive experiences. In his view, mystical states of consciousness are characterized by: (1) infallibility; (2) noetic quality; (3) transitivity; (4) passivity. The purpose of this article is to analyse how William James describes phenomenologically different mystical states in order to arrive at the conception of the mystical itself.
Uz zināmā un nezināmā robežas. Sast., zin. red. I. Kivle, R. Bičevskis. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2024. 184. lpp.